Secure access for sensitive digital information

ABSTRACT

Sensitive pieces of information stored on an individual&#39;s device can be protected using a device identification system that applies, for each sensitive piece of information, a function that integrates an identifier of the individual with a respective sensitive piece of information to create a respective identity element. Each identity element can be signed with a signature to create a trust group. The identity element and signature can be uploaded to the individual&#39;s device using an application that is configured to provide a subset of the sensitive pieces of information in response to a query.

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.14/471,193, filed Aug. 28, 2014, which is a continuation application ofU.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/154,615, filed Jan. 14, 2014, theentire content and disclosure of which is incorporated herein byreference.

BACKGROUND

The present disclosure relates to verification of digital data elements,and more specifically, to verifying the integrity of relationshipsbetween digital data elements.

Cryptographic functions and algorithms can be used to help protectsensitive data, such as personal information about an individual. Afirst type of cryptographic function is a symmetric-key algorithm.Symmetric-key algorithms use the same cryptographic key for bothencryption and decryption. Both the sending and receiving party shouldmaintain the secrecy of the key in order to prevent a third party fromgaining access to the encrypted information.

A second type of cryptographic function is an asymmetric-key algorithm.Asymmetric key algorithms can be used in a variety of manners. In oneinstance, a first party can encrypt data using a first (private) key. Asecond party can then decrypt the data using a second (public) key. Thiscan be useful for verifying the source of the data as only the owner ofthe private key can encrypt data that will be decrypted using theassociated public key. Alternately, the second party could encrypt datausing the public key and the first party can then decrypt the data usingits private key. This can be helpful to ensure that only the owner ofthe private key can decrypt the data. The use of two different keys canbe useful for a variety of different applications. In some instances,the first party can use the private key to create a digital signature.The second party can then use the public key and digital signature toverify that the contents of the data were sent by the first party andhave not been modified.

SUMMARY

Embodiments are directed toward a method for protecting sensitive piecesof information stored on an individual's device and using a deviceidentification system. The method includes applying, for each sensitivepiece of information, a function that integrates an identifier of theindividual with a respective sensitive piece of information to create arespective identity element; digitally signing each identity elementwith a signature to create a trust group; and uploading the identityelement and signature to the individual's device using an applicationthat is configured to provide a subset of the sensitive pieces ofinformation in response to a query.

Various embodiments include a method for verifying sensitive pieces ofinformation. The method includes establishing a communication linkbetween a verification device and an individual's device that stores aplurality of sensitive pieces of information about the individual;sending, to the individual's device, a query for a subset that includesat least two of the plurality of sensitive pieces of information aboutthe individual; receiving, in response to the query and at theverification device, the subset; receiving, in response to the query andat the verification device, an identifier of the individual; verifyingthat each piece of sensitive information of the subset belongs to a sametrust group by: applying a signature algorithm to a first piece ofsensitive information from the subset and to the identifier, applyingthe signature algorithm to a second piece of sensitive information fromthe subset and to the identifier, and verifying, based upon a resultfrom the signature algorithm, that the first piece of sensitiveinformation and the second piece of sensitive information belong to atrust group defined by the identifier.

Certain embodiments are directed toward a system comprising: averification device designed to establish a communication link between averification device and an individual's device that stores a pluralityof sensitive pieces of information about the individual; send, to theindividual's device, a query for a subset that includes at least two ofthe plurality of sensitive pieces of information about the individual;receive, in response to the query and at the verification device, thesubset; receive, in response to the query and at the verificationdevice, an identifier of the individual; verify that each piece ofsensitive information of the subset belongs to a same trust group by:applying a signature algorithm to a first piece of sensitive informationfrom the subset and to the identifier, applying the signature algorithmto a second piece of sensitive information from the subset and to theidentifier, and verifying, based upon a result from the signaturealgorithm, that the first piece of sensitive information and the secondpiece of sensitive information belong to a trust group defined by theidentifier.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE SEVERAL VIEWS OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 depicts a block diagram for system useful for securing sensitivedata elements, consistent with embodiments of the present disclosure;

FIG. 2 depicts a flow diagram for verifying trust of sensitive elementsof an individual, consistent with embodiments of the present disclosure;

FIG. 3 depicts a flow diagram for signing sensitive data elements usinga homomorphism relating to a trust between the elements, consistent withembodiments of the present disclosure;

FIG. 4 depicts a flow diagram for using a homomorphism that is basedupon image files of individuals, consistent with embodiments of thepresent disclosure;

FIG. 5 depicts a flow diagram for a process of generating a homomorphismbetween multiple pieces of sensitive information, consistent withembodiments of the present disclosure; and

FIG. 6 depicts a flow diagram for a process of verifying multiple piecesof sensitive information, consistent with embodiments of the presentdisclosure.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Aspects of the present disclosure relate to securing and verifyingsensitive information, and more particular aspects relate to securing anindividual's sensitive information while providing a corresponding trustgroup therewith. While the present invention is not necessarily limitedto such applications, various aspects of the invention may beappreciated through a discussion of various examples using this context.

Embodiments of the present disclosure are directed toward providingcontrol over identity information in a manner that can provideflexibility and security. For instance, government identity cardsprovide a host of useful identity information. Much of this information,however, can be surplus for any particular transaction or verification.A retailer needing to verify that a customer's name matches that of acredit card may not need information about the customer's address, age,weight or other information on the card. A seller of age restrictedgoods (e.g., alcohol, cigarettes or firearms) may need to know that thecustomer is older than the restricted age, but not their address, actualage or other information. Aspects of the present disclosure facilitatethe presentation of subsets of the set of available informationdepending upon the particular need, while providing verification of thevarious subsets.

Certain embodiments are directed toward the use of a digital grouping,or set, of sensitive data elements for an individual. This set ofsensitive data elements can function in lieu, or in addition, toidentification cards by including similar information. The set ofsensitive data elements can be stored on an individual's electronicdevice such as, but not necessarily limited to, a smart phone, computertablet, laptop computer, smart card, radio frequency identifier (RFID)card or personal computer. A verification device can be configured tointeract with the individual's electronic device to request, or query,the individual's electronic device for particular pieces of sensitiveinformation. The devices can be configured to use digital signaturemodules that allow for different sets of sensitive information to beverified with respect to the originator of the sensitive information(e.g., a governmental agency) and with one another (e.g., all for thesame individual).

According to embodiments, group homomorphism can be created and used inconnection with digital signatures for sensitive pieces of information.The homomorphism can be useful for reducing concerns over privacy of thesensitive information by facilitating the selective use of differentcombinations of sensitive pieces depending upon the particular need. Forinstance, the group homomorphism can be used to ensure that, fordifferent combinations of the pieces of information, a verifying partycan confirm both the integrity of the data content for sensitive piecesof information and that they are for the same individual.

Embodiments of the present disclosure make use of an identifier that iscommon between sensitive pieces of information that belong to the sameindividual and the same group. A different identifier can be used foreach individual supported by the source of the sensitive pieces ofinformation. For instance, the sensitive pieces of information could bepart of a government identification package that contains informationtraditionally contained on a physical identification card, such as agovernment issued identification card (driver's license or otherwise).Each person that is issued an identification package could also beissued a different (unique) identifier. As non-limiting examples, theidentifiers could be alphanumeric numbers, numbers (binary, hex orotherwise), image files or other types of files. This identifier canthen be used to create the group homomorphism and thereby allowindividual pieces of sensitive information to be verified with respectto their individual content as well as their relationship to oneanother.

Various aspects of the present disclosure are directed toward the use ofa material equivalence of two groups having homomorphism to a uniqueidentifier (x). The homomorphism can be defined as G→H orΦx(u+v)=Φ_(x)(u)+Φ_(x)((v), where Φ_(x) is a digital signature of thedata that includes the unique identifier x and for which there is ahomomorphism for the data. For instance, the homomorphism can berepresented by valid trust relationship for the digital signature of thecombined sensitive elements (u+v) and also for the separate digitalsignatures of each element Φ_(x)(u+v) and Φ_(x)(u)+Φ_(x)(v) are eachvalid signatures).

For instance, a first data element (u) could represent an image file fora photograph of an individual and a second data element (v) couldrepresent the name of the individual. If function Φ_(x) is used to signthe combination of both data elements (u+v), this results in a trustgroup G. The function Φ_(x) can also be used to sign each data elementwith the identifier x to establish a group homomorphism to a group H(FIG. 4, 400):

Group Homomorphism

G→H

Φ_(x)(u+v)=φ_(x)(u)+φ_(x)(v)

The trust for the data elements in groups G and H can thereby beequivalent pursuant to the group homomorphism. This can be particularlyuseful for establishing that data elements belong to one another despitehaving been individually signed. This can also allow for multiplepermutations of super groups with appropriate trust relationships. Eachsuper group can be defined according to the particular use andapplication, such as providing name and age in one instance and addressand gender in another.

Consistent with embodiments, an image file of a photo for the individualcan be used as the common homomorphism (x) for the corresponding set ofsensitive data elements. For instance, the sensitive data elements canbe represented by image files. This could include image files of textualdata, such as name or birth date. A first group (G) could be createdthat is a combination of two or more images. A function can then beapplied in which the common homomorphism (x) is included as part of thedigital signature. A second group (H) can also be created by applyingthe function to each sensitive data element individually. Consistentwith certain embodiments, the common homomorphism can be an image file(x). Trust for two data elements can be verified by a visual overlay ofthe image file (x) from each sensitive data element. A visual disparity,as would occur due to data being for different individuals or imagescaptured at different times, indicates a failed trust. In instanceswhere the one of the sensitive data elements is also a file for theimage of the individual, this image can also be added as part of thevisual overlay. In certain embodiments, this sensitive data element ofthe image file can have a different (e.g., higher) resolution than theimage file of the identifiers.

Consistent with embodiments, a function f: G->H between two groups is ahomomorphism when f(xy)=f(x)f(y) for all x and y in G. Themultiplication of xy is in G and the multiplication of f(x)f(y) is in H,so the homomorphism from G to H involves a function that transforms theoperation G to the operation in H. Examples of two homeomorphismsinclude: e^(x+y)=e^(x)e^(y) and log_(a)(xy)=log_(a)(x)+log_(a)(y). Thelog function provides an example of a binary operation of multiplicationthat can translate to a binary operation of addition for a function.

As non limiting examples, the data elements could be part of a virtualidentification card. The virtual identification card can be display adesired subset of data elements that are visible within a card likeoutline. This card could be use for purposes such as driver's licensing,governmental identifier cards, healthcare cards, insurance cards, creditcards, security identifier cards for businesses or government, andothers.

Turning now to the figures, FIG. 1 depicts a block diagram for systemuseful for securing sensitive data elements, consistent with embodimentsof the present disclosure. According to embodiments of the presentdisclosure, a trusted entity 124 system can be configured to provideinformation about a group of individuals in the form of a plurality ofsensitive pieces of information about each individual. For instance, thetrusted entity could be a government agency that traditionally issuesidentification cards, driver's licenses, hunting licenses or similaritems. A computer system of the trusted entity can access databases thatcontain sensitive pieces of information (sensitive element database126). Consistent with embodiments, the trusted entity can also use a setof identifiers for the individuals, which can be stored in identifiersdatabase 128. As discussed herein, the identifiers can take a number ofdifferent forms including, but not limited to, alphanumeric characters,binary strings, image files and combinations thereof.

Consistent with embodiments, the trusted entity system 124 can include asignature creation module 125. Signature creation module 125 can beconfigured and designed to use the sensitive elements and identifiers tocreate a homomorphism relative to trust for a first group in which aplurality of sensitive data elements are analyzed as a single entity andtrust for a second group in which the sensitive data elements areindividual analyzed. For instance, the signature creation module 125 canbe configured to use a function that signs each sensitive data elementindividually, but also using an identifier for the correspondingindividual for this signature creation.

The signed elements and identifiers can then be provided, or uploaded,to electronic devices 102, which can be owned by the individualscorresponding to the sensitive data elements. A variety of differentelectronic devices can be used including, but not necessarily limitedto, personal computers 108, smart phones 116, tablets 120, RFID cards,and smart cards (not shown). Each device can store one or more sets ofsensitive elements 106, 114, 118, along with a corresponding identifier.These sensitive elements 106, 114, 118 may then be used to provideverification of different attributes associated with the individual.

In certain embodiments, verification devices 104 can be configured toestablish a communication link with one or more of the electronicdevices 102. This link can be made over a variety of different mediumsand using various protocols including, but not limited to, the use ofnetworks 110 (e.g., local area networks, wide area networks, theInternet and combinations thereof), direct communication links (e.g.,near field communication (NFC), Bluetooth, IEEE 802.xx and combinationsthereof). In certain embodiments, the verification devices can includecomputer servers 112, handheld devices 122 or other electronic devices.

According to embodiments, verification devices 104 can query theelectronic devices 102 for particular elements 106. These queries can belimited so as to exclude extraneous sensitive information relative tothe particular purpose of the query. For instance, a bartender may havea need to confirm that a person is who they say they are and that theyare over 21 years old. Additional information, such as address, weight,gender and other, may not be required or even desirable. For instance,by limiting the query to only specified information by the individualand querying party can have confidence that unnecessary information willnot be misused because it is not being provided.

In response to such a query, the electronic devices 104 can provide theappropriate elements along with the associated identifier. Theverification devices 104 can be configured to apply a function thattakes advantage of the group homomorphism created by the use of theassociated identifier. This can facilitate the ability to verify trustbetween different sets of elements.

FIG. 2 depicts a flow diagram for verifying trust of sensitive elementsof an individual, consistent with embodiments of the present disclosure.An individual's electronic device 202 can store a number of differentsensitive (data) elements 204, 206, 208. As discussed herein, each ofthese sensitive elements can contain data about the individual (e.g.,one or more of: a name, an address, a date of birth, license status, animage of the individual, a driver's license number, an expiration dateand physical characteristics of the individual). Moreover, the sensitivedata elements can also each have a corresponding signature, which wasgenerated in a manner that creates a group homomorphism related to thetrust between the different sensitive elements.

Verification device 212 can receive subset of the sensitive elements inresponse to a query. For instance, the verification device may receive(e.g., from a trusted entity database) and store local copies 214, 216,218, 220 of sensitive element (1), signature (1), sensitive element (2)and signature (2), respectively. The identifier 210 can also be providedand stored locally. A verification function can then be applied toconfirm the authenticity of both the data and the trust between theelements.

For instance, the function can use the signature (1) and signature (2)to create digest (1) 224 and digest (2) 228. Using a signature protocol,such as Digital Signature Standard (DSS) and corresponding algorithm(e.g., digital signature algorithm (DSA)), digest (1) and digest (2) canbe generated by applying a public key of the trusted entity to decryptthe corresponding signatures. The verification device 212 can alsocreate digest (1)′ and digest (2)′ from sensitive element (1) and (2),respectively. Consistent with certain embodiments, the digest′ can begenerated using a one-way (hash) function, such as secure hashalgorithm-1 (SHA-1) or SHA-2. The second set of digests can also begenerated using a function that takes advantage of the homomorphismderived from the use of the identifier with each sensitive element.

The verification device can be configured to compare 230, 232 the digestderived from a signature with a corresponding digest derived from thecontent of a sensitive element. A match between digests can indicatethat the data is authentic and can be trusted. A mismatch indicates apotential security or integrity issue with the data. As each comparisonalso verifies the identifier, a match also verifies that the sensitiveelements belong to the same trust group. Two sensitive elements aredepicted in FIG. 2, but additional sensitive elements can be receivedand verified using the group homomorphism that is based upon the commonidentifier.

The verifier can be notified of the results of the verification using avariety of different indicators. These can include, but are notnecessarily limited to, displaying text or graphics (e.g., “fail” or“success”), generating audio (e.g., tones or voice), showing a visualdisparity between two images (e.g., disparity of images of differentindividuals) and combinations thereof.

FIG. 3 depicts a flow diagram for signing sensitive data elements usinga homomorphism relating to a trust between the elements, consistent withembodiments of the present disclosure. A set of sensitive data elementsfor an individual (e.g., Jane) can include a variety of differentattributes and information about the individual including, but notlimited to, a picture 302, an age 306 and other info 308. A signaturecreation module (e.g., signature creation module 125) can use ahomomorphism that associates a common identifier (ID) 304 each of thesesensitive data elements.

Consistent with embodiments, a digest 312, 314, 316 can be created foreach of the sensitive elements using a digest function 310. As discussedherein, the digest function can include the use of a hash function andcan create a homomorphism by adding the identifier to each piece ofsensitive information to create an identity element and before creatingthe corresponding digest. For instance, the identifier could be a numberthat uniquely identifies the individual (Jane). The digest function 310can append, or otherwise add, the identifier to the data content of eachsensitive element (to create an identity element) before applying a hashfunction, such as SHA-1 or SHA-2. In another instance, the identifiercould be an image file of the individual (Jane). The digest function 310could integrate the image file of the identifier with each sensitiveelement before applying a hash function. This integration could be atthe binary level, at an image level (e.g., by merging the image of theidentifier with an image of content of the sensitive data) or at otherlevels. The signature module can then encrypt each digest using aprivate key encryption algorithm 318 in order to generate signatures320, 322 and 324.

The resulting signatures can be provided along with the sensitiveelements and identifiers to the proper individuals. For instance, Janecould receive a smart card that stores this information. The informationcould also be uploaded to an electronic device, such as a smart phone,tablet or computer. A software application could also be loaded onto theelectronic device in order to coordinate communications with averification device.

FIG. 4 depicts a flow diagram for using a homomorphism that is basedupon image files of individuals, consistent with embodiments of thepresent disclosure. Consistent with certain embodiments, the grouphomomorphism 400 can be based upon an image file containing an image ofthe individual associated with a set of sensitive data elements. Forinstance, a verification device may receive two pieces of sensitiveinformation 404, 406 (sensitive data elements), which can be a subset ofthe available information to prevent unnecessary disclosure of theremaining, unused, sensitive information. These sensitive elements mayinclude binary information 408, 412 for each sensitive data element aswell as an image file 410, 414 (identifiers).

Individuals may attempt to mix sensitive elements from differentindividuals as a deception. For instance, a first individual (Jane) mayattempt to use sensitive information of Jane (408) and at the same timeuse sensitive information (412) that is for a second individual (Joe).For instance, Jane may be under 21, while Joe is over 21. Jane may beattempting to deceive a bartender by providing her identity information(408) with Joe's age information (412).

In order to successfully verify (402) the sensitive information of Joe,Jane will provide Joe's identifier (binary image file 414). In order tosuccessfully verify (402) the sensitive information of Jane, Jane willprovide her own identifier (binary image file 410). Various embodimentsare directed toward an additional trust verification in which the images416, 418 are merged 420 to produce an overlay 422 from the image files410, 414. This overlay can be displayed to the verifier. If the imagefiles are for different individuals, the verifier will be able to seethe visual disparity in the overlay 422.

In certain embodiments, the images 416, 418 can also include a(graphic/textual) visible representation of the sensitive information408, 412. The overlay 422 can thereby include and display the desiredsubset of information as well as the visual overlay of the images.Various embodiments also allow for the use of additional information asto whether or not the verification succeeded (e.g., graphics, text oraudio that indicate a failed or successful verification)

In certain embodiments, one of the sensitive elements may also be animage file for the image of the individual. This image file can beidentical to the identifier(s) or it may have a different resolution,but still be of the same underlying image. This image file can also beadded to the overlay. Consistent with embodiments of the presentdisclosure, the binary image files can be of a variety of images otherthan the corresponding individuals but yet uniquely linked to anindividual including, but not limited to, text (e.g., text of analphanumeric identifier).

FIG. 5 depicts a flow diagram for a process of generating a grouphomomorphism between multiple pieces of sensitive information,consistent with embodiments of the present disclosure. According toembodiments, this process can be implemented by a trusted entity system,such as the trusted entity system 124 of FIG. 1. The process can beginby selecting a current piece of sensitive information (POI) for anindividual, per block 502. The process can also include creating orretrieving an identifier for the individual, per block 504. As discussedherein, this identifier can be used to create a group homomorphism inwhich the trust relationship between a first group (G) of the entire setof sensitive information of the individual is maintained for a group (H)containing subsets of the entire set of sensitive information of theindividual.

Consistent with embodiments, a function can be applied that integratesthe identifier with the current POI, per block 506. This integration cantake a variety for different forms including, but not limited to,appending the identifier as a binary operation, appending the identifierin the image space or applying a more complex function based upon thesetwo inputs.

The integrated output can then be digitally signed, per block 508. Asdiscussed herein, the digital signature process can include the creationof a digest, which can then be encrypted using a private key encryptionalgorithm (e.g., consistent with DSS and DSA).

The system can then determine whether or not there are additional POIs,per block 510. If there are additional POIs, the system can select/setthe next POI as the current POI, per block 512. The process can thenproceed at block 506 using this new POI. If there are no additionalPOIs, then the system can provide or upload the signed POIs to thecorresponding individual's device(s).

FIG. 6 depicts a flow diagram for a process of verifying multiple piecesof sensitive information, consistent with embodiments of the presentdisclosure. Consistent with embodiments, a communication link can beestablished between an individual's device and a verifying device, perblock 602. As discussed herein, a variety of different types ofcommunication links are possible. In certain embodiments thecommunication link can be established in response to a selection (e.g.,as part of a software application) made by the individual, the verifieror both. The communication link can also be established automatically,such as in response to bringing the two devices within a proximity andusing near field communication (NFC).

In various embodiments, the verification device can be configured toquery the individual's device for a subset of the available sensitiveinformation, per block 604. For instance, a verification device used bya police officer as part of a routine traffic stop may send query forname, license number, driving restrictions, but not query for homeaddress information.

In response to the query, the individual's device can provide therequested subset of information, which is then received by theverification device, per block 606. In addition, the verification devicecan receive an identifier that can be used to verify that the separatepieces of information belong to a single trust group.

The verification device can then verify each piece of information, perblock 608. This verification can include verifying using a providedsignature and a function that uses the provided identifier incombination with the provided pieces of information. The verificationdevice can then determine whether or not any of the signature-basedverifications failed, per block 610. If so, then the verificationprocess can be considered a failure, per block 612. It not, then theverification device can also verify that the pieces of informationbelong to the same trust group (using the homomorphism that is basedupon the use of a common identifier), per block 614. If thisverification fails, then the verification process fails, per block 612.Otherwise, the verification can be considered successful, per block 616.

As will be appreciated by one skilled in the art, aspects of the presentinvention may be embodied as a system, method or computer programproduct. Accordingly, aspects of the present invention may take the formof an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment(including firmware, resident software, micro-code, etc.) or anembodiment combining software and hardware aspects that may allgenerally be referred to herein as a “circuit,” “module” or “system.”Furthermore, aspects of the present invention may take the form of acomputer program product embodied in one or more computer readablemedium(s) having computer readable program code embodied thereon.

Any combination of one or more computer readable medium(s) may beutilized. The computer readable medium may be a computer readable signalmedium or a computer readable storage medium. A computer readablestorage medium may be, for example, but not limited to, an electronic,magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system,apparatus, or device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. Morespecific examples (a non-exhaustive list) of the computer readablestorage medium would include the following: an electrical connectionhaving one or more wires, a portable computer diskette, a hard disk, arandom access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasableprogrammable read-only memory (EPROM or Flash memory), an optical fiber,a portable compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), an optical storagedevice, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of theforegoing. In the context of this document, a computer readable storagemedium may be any tangible medium that can contain, or store a programfor use by or in connection with an instruction execution system,apparatus, or device.

A computer readable signal medium may include a propagated data signalwith computer readable program code embodied therein, for example, inbaseband or as part of a carrier wave. Such a propagated signal may takeany of a variety of forms, including, but not limited to,electro-magnetic, optical, or any suitable combination thereof. Acomputer readable signal medium may be any computer readable medium thatis not a computer readable storage medium and that can communicate,propagate, or transport a program for use by or in connection with aninstruction execution system, apparatus, or device.

Program code embodied on a computer readable medium may be transmittedusing any appropriate medium, including but not limited to wireless,wireline, optical fiber cable, RF, etc., or any suitable combination ofthe foregoing.

Computer program code for carrying out operations for aspects of thepresent invention may be written in any combination of one or moreprogramming languages, including an object oriented programming languagesuch as Java, Smalltalk, C++ or the like and conventional proceduralprogramming languages, such as the “C” programming language or similarprogramming languages. The program code may execute entirely on theuser's computer, partly on the user's computer, as a stand-alonesoftware package, partly on the user's computer and partly on a remotecomputer or entirely on the remote computer or server. In the latterscenario, the remote computer may be connected to the user's computerthrough any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or awide area network (WAN), or the connection may be made to an externalcomputer (for example, through the Internet using an Internet ServiceProvider).

Aspects of the present invention are described below with reference toflowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus(systems) and computer program products according to embodiments of theinvention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchartillustrations and/or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in theflowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, can be implemented bycomputer program instructions. These computer program instructions maybe provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, specialpurpose computer, or other programmable data processing apparatus toproduce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via theprocessor of the computer or other programmable data processingapparatus, create means for implementing the functions/acts specified inthe flowchart and/or block diagram block or blocks.

These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computerreadable medium that can direct a computer, other programmable dataprocessing apparatus, or other devices to function in a particularmanner, such that the instructions stored in the computer readablemedium produce an article of manufacture including instructions whichimplement the function/act specified in the flowchart and/or blockdiagram block or blocks.

The computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer,other programmable data processing apparatus, or other devices to causea series of operational steps to be performed on the computer, otherprogrammable apparatus or other devices to produce a computerimplemented process such that the instructions which execute on thecomputer or other programmable apparatus provide processes forimplementing the functions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or blockdiagram block or blocks.

The flowchart and block diagrams in the Figures illustrate thearchitecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementationsof systems, methods and computer program products according to variousembodiments of the present invention. In this regard, each block in theflowchart or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portionof code, which comprises one or more executable instructions forimplementing the specified logical function(s). It should also be notedthat, in some alternative implementations, the functions noted in theblock may occur out of the order noted in the figures. For example, twoblocks shown in succession may, in fact, be executed substantiallyconcurrently, or the blocks may sometimes be executed in the reverseorder, depending upon the functionality involved. It will also be notedthat each block of the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustration, andcombinations of blocks in the block diagrams and/or flowchartillustration, can be implemented by special purpose hardware-basedsystems that perform the specified functions or acts, or combinations ofspecial purpose hardware and computer instructions.

The descriptions of the various embodiments of the present disclosurehave been presented for purposes of illustration, but are not intendedto be exhaustive or limited to the embodiments disclosed. Manymodifications and variations will be apparent to those of ordinary skillin the art without departing from the scope and spirit of the describedembodiments. The terminology used herein was chosen to best explain theprinciples of the embodiments, the practical application or technicalimprovement over technologies found in the marketplace, or to enableothers of ordinary skill in the art to understand the embodimentsdisclosed herein.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for verifying authenticity of sensitivepieces of information, the method comprising: receiving, at a processingdevice of a computer system, one or more sensitive pieces of informationassociated with an individual, obtaining an identifier from theindividual used in forming a group homomorphism; obtaining a respectivesignature element corresponding to a received sensitive piece ofinformation, said corresponding signature element having beingpreviously generated by integrating, using a digest function, anidentifier of the individual with the respective sensitive piece ofinformation about the individual to create a respective digest, and byencrypting the respective digest with an private key encryption functionto form the respective signature; generating, by the processing device,a digest corresponding to the received sensitive piece of informationthat takes advantage of the group homomorphism derived from a use of theobtained identifier with the received sensitive piece of information;applying, at the processing device, a corresponding public key functionto the received corresponding signature element to derive a digestcorresponding from the obtained respective signature corresponding tothe respective sensitive piece of information received; comparing, usingthe processing device, said generated digest and corresponding deriveddigest of the received sensitive piece of information; and verifyingwhether a content of said received sensitive piece of information isauthentic based on a result of said comparing.
 2. The method of claim 1,further comprising: repeating, for each received sensitive piece ofinformation: said generating, by the processing device, a digestcorresponding to the received sensitive piece of information, saidderiving a corresponding digest, said comparing and said verifying,wherein a match between a digest and a corresponding derived digestindicates that a content of said piece of sensitive information isauthentic and verifies that the sensitive pieces of information belongto a same trust group defined by the identifier.
 3. The method of claim1, wherein the identifier is an alphanumeric character string.
 4. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the identifier is a file having contentcomprising an image of the individual.
 5. The method of claim 4, whereinthe identifier is a first file having content comprising an image of theindividual and at least one of the received sensitive pieces ofinformation includes a second file having content comprising an image ofthe individual.
 6. The method of claim 5, wherein the image content ofthe first file and image content of the second file are of a same imagebut at different resolutions.
 7. The method of claim 4, wherein thedigest function integrates the image content of the individual with therespective sensitive piece of information based upon the grouphomomorphism that establishes the trust group between the sensitivepieces of information.
 8. The method of claim 1, wherein the digestfunction performs said integration by merging the image content of theindividual with an image of content of each respective sensitive piecesof information.
 9. The method of claim 1, wherein the digest functionperforms said integration by appending the image content of theindividual as a binary operation, or appending the identifier of theindividual in an image space.
 10. The method of claim 1, wherein thecomparing comprises: visually overlaying an image content obtained fromeach sensitive pieces of information, said verifying including verifyingwhether a visual disparity exists between said overlayed image contents.11. A verification apparatus comprising: a processing device configuredto: receive one or more sensitive pieces of information associated withan individual, obtain an identifier from the individual used in forminga group homomorphism; obtain a respective signature elementcorresponding to a received sensitive piece of information, saidcorresponding signature element having being previously generated byintegrating, using a digest function, an identifier of the individualwith the respective sensitive piece of information about the individualto create a respective digest, and by encrypting the respective digestwith an private key encryption function to form the respectivesignature; generate a digest corresponding to the received sensitivepiece of information that takes advantage of the group homomorphismderived from a use of the obtained identifier with the receivedsensitive piece of information; apply a corresponding public keyfunction to the received corresponding signature element to derive adigest corresponding from the obtained respective signaturecorresponding to the respective sensitive piece of information received;compare said generated digest and corresponding derived digest of thereceived sensitive piece of information; and verify whether a content ofsaid received sensitive piece of information is authentic based on aresult of said comparing.
 12. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein theprocessing device if further configured to: repeat, for each receivedsensitive piece of information, said generating a digest correspondingto the received sensitive piece of information, said deriving acorresponding digest, said comparing and said verifying, wherein a matchbetween a digest and a corresponding derived digest indicates that acontent of said piece of sensitive information is authentic and verifiesthat the sensitive pieces of information belong to a same trust groupdefined by the identifier.
 13. The apparatus of claim 11, wherein theidentifier is a file having content comprising an image of theindividual.
 14. The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the identifier is afirst file having content comprising an image of the individual and atleast one of the received sensitive pieces of information includes asecond file having content comprising an image of the individual. 15.The apparatus of claim 14, wherein the image content of the first fileand image content of the second file are of a same image but atdifferent resolutions.
 16. The apparatus of claim 13, wherein theprocessing device applies said digest function to integrate the imagecontent of the individual with the respective sensitive piece ofinformation based upon the group homomorphism that establishes the trustgroup between the sensitive pieces of information.
 17. The apparatus ofclaim 13, wherein the processing device applies said digest function tomerge the image content of the individual with an image of content ofeach respective sensitive pieces of information.
 18. The apparatus ofclaim 13, wherein the processing device applies said digest function toappend the image content of the individual as a binary operation, orappend the identifier of the individual in an image space.
 19. Theapparatus of claim 13, wherein to compare, the processing device isfurther configured to: visually overlay an image content obtained fromeach sensitive pieces of information, said verifying including verifyingwhether a visual disparity exists between said overlayed image contents.20. A computer program product for verifying authenticity of sensitivepieces of information comprising: a computer readable storage mediumhaving program instructions embodied therewith, wherein the computerreadable storage medium is not a transitory signal per se, the programinstructions readable by a processing circuit to cause the processingcircuit to perform a method to: receive one or more sensitive pieces ofinformation associated with an individual, obtain an identifier from theindividual used in forming a group homomorphism; obtain a respectivesignature element corresponding to a received sensitive piece ofinformation, said corresponding signature element having beingpreviously generated by integrating, using a digest function, anidentifier of the individual with the respective sensitive piece ofinformation about the individual to create a respective digest, and byencrypting the respective digest with an private key encryption functionto form the respective signature; generate a digest corresponding to thereceived sensitive piece of information that takes advantage of thegroup homomorphism derived from a use of the obtained identifier withthe received sensitive piece of information; apply a correspondingpublic key function to the received corresponding signature element toderive a digest corresponding from the obtained respective signaturecorresponding to the respective sensitive piece of information received;compare said generated digest and corresponding derived digest of thereceived sensitive piece of information; and verify whether a content ofsaid received sensitive piece of information is authentic based on aresult of said comparing.